v1.7.2 (#364)
* Feature request: Add delete confirmation dialog to file manager (#344) * Feature request: Add delete confirmation dialog to file manager - Added confirmation dialog before deleting files/folders - Users must confirm deletion with a warning message - Works for both Delete key and right-click delete - Shows different messages for single file, folder, or multiple items - Includes permanent deletion warning - Follows existing design patterns using confirmWithToast * Adds confirmation for deletion of items including folders Updates the file deletion confirmation logic to distinguish between deleting multiple items with or without folders. Introduces a new translation string for a clearer user prompt when folders and their contents are included in the deletion. Improves clarity and reduces user error when performing bulk deletions. * feat: Add Chinese translations for delete confirmation messages * Adds camelCase support for encrypted field mappings (#342) Extends encrypted field mappings to include camelCase variants to support consistency and compatibility with different naming conventions. Updates reverse mappings for Drizzle ORM to allow conversion between camelCase and snake_case field names. Improves integration with systems using mixed naming styles. * Run code cleanup, add sidebar persistence, fix OIDC credentials, force SSH password. * Fix snake case mismatching * Add real client IP * Fix OIDC credential persistence issue The issue was that OIDC users were getting a new random Data Encryption Key (DEK) on every login, which made previously encrypted credentials inaccessible. Changes: - Modified setupOIDCUserEncryption() to persist the DEK encrypted with a system-derived key - Updated authenticateOIDCUser() to properly retrieve and use the persisted DEK - Ensured OIDC users now have the same encryption persistence as password-based users This fix ensures that credentials created by OIDC users remain accessible across multiple login sessions. * Fix race condition and remove redundant kekSalt for OIDC users Critical fixes: 1. Race Condition Mitigation: - Added read-after-write verification in setupOIDCUserEncryption() - Ensures session uses the DEK that's actually in the database - Prevents data loss when concurrent logins occur for new OIDC users - If race is detected, discards generated DEK and uses stored one 2. Remove Redundant kekSalt Logic: - Removed unnecessary kekSalt generation and checks for OIDC users - kekSalt is not used in OIDC key derivation (uses userId as salt) - Reduces database operations from 4 to 2 per authentication - Simplifies code and removes potential confusion 3. Improved Error Handling: - systemKey cleanup moved to finally block - Ensures sensitive key material is always cleared from memory These changes ensure data consistency and prevent potential data loss in high-concurrency scenarios. * Cleanup OIDC pr and run prettier --------- Co-authored-by: Ved Prakash <54140516+thorved@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit was merged in pull request #364.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -6,6 +6,20 @@ export class LazyFieldEncryption {
|
||||
key_password: "keyPassword",
|
||||
private_key: "privateKey",
|
||||
public_key: "publicKey",
|
||||
password_hash: "passwordHash",
|
||||
client_secret: "clientSecret",
|
||||
totp_secret: "totpSecret",
|
||||
totp_backup_codes: "totpBackupCodes",
|
||||
oidc_identifier: "oidcIdentifier",
|
||||
|
||||
keyPassword: "key_password",
|
||||
privateKey: "private_key",
|
||||
publicKey: "public_key",
|
||||
passwordHash: "password_hash",
|
||||
clientSecret: "client_secret",
|
||||
totpSecret: "totp_secret",
|
||||
totpBackupCodes: "totp_backup_codes",
|
||||
oidcIdentifier: "oidc_identifier",
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static isPlaintextField(value: string): boolean {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +70,36 @@ class UserCrypto {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async setupOIDCUserEncryption(userId: string): Promise<void> {
|
||||
const DEK = crypto.randomBytes(UserCrypto.DEK_LENGTH);
|
||||
const existingEncryptedDEK = await this.getEncryptedDEK(userId);
|
||||
|
||||
let DEK: Buffer;
|
||||
|
||||
if (existingEncryptedDEK) {
|
||||
const systemKey = this.deriveOIDCSystemKey(userId);
|
||||
DEK = this.decryptDEK(existingEncryptedDEK, systemKey);
|
||||
systemKey.fill(0);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
DEK = crypto.randomBytes(UserCrypto.DEK_LENGTH);
|
||||
const systemKey = this.deriveOIDCSystemKey(userId);
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const encryptedDEK = this.encryptDEK(DEK, systemKey);
|
||||
await this.storeEncryptedDEK(userId, encryptedDEK);
|
||||
|
||||
const storedEncryptedDEK = await this.getEncryptedDEK(userId);
|
||||
if (
|
||||
storedEncryptedDEK &&
|
||||
storedEncryptedDEK.data !== encryptedDEK.data
|
||||
) {
|
||||
DEK.fill(0);
|
||||
DEK = this.decryptDEK(storedEncryptedDEK, systemKey);
|
||||
} else if (!storedEncryptedDEK) {
|
||||
throw new Error("Failed to store and retrieve user encryption key.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
systemKey.fill(0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const now = Date.now();
|
||||
this.userSessions.set(userId, {
|
||||
@@ -134,20 +163,14 @@ class UserCrypto {
|
||||
|
||||
async authenticateOIDCUser(userId: string): Promise<boolean> {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const kekSalt = await this.getKEKSalt(userId);
|
||||
if (!kekSalt) {
|
||||
const encryptedDEK = await this.getEncryptedDEK(userId);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!encryptedDEK) {
|
||||
await this.setupOIDCUserEncryption(userId);
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const systemKey = this.deriveOIDCSystemKey(userId);
|
||||
const encryptedDEK = await this.getEncryptedDEK(userId);
|
||||
if (!encryptedDEK) {
|
||||
systemKey.fill(0);
|
||||
await this.setupOIDCUserEncryption(userId);
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const DEK = this.decryptDEK(encryptedDEK, systemKey);
|
||||
systemKey.fill(0);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user